


m_1, m_2 - certain sums of money

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} m_i = m_1 + m_2 \\ m_0 = m_3 + m_4 \end{array} \right\} m_i = m_\sigma$$



Transactions confidentiality

To hide sums $m_1 = 2000$; $m_2 = 3000$.

To provide confidential transactions numbers

$$n_1 = g^{m_1} \bmod p \text{ and } n_2 = g^{m_2} \bmod p \text{ are encrypted}$$

$$n_1 \cdot n_2 \bmod p = (g^{m_1} \bmod p \cdot g^{m_2} \bmod p) \bmod p = g^{(m_1+m_2) \bmod p-1} \bmod p$$

$$m_3 = 1000; m_4 = 4000$$

$$n_3 = g^{m_3} \bmod p \text{ and } n_4 = g^{m_4} \bmod p.$$

$$n_3 \cdot n_4 = g^{(m_3+m_4) \bmod (p-1)} \bmod p \leftarrow \text{Fermat theorem:}$$

Operations in exponents can be reduced mod $(p-1)$ $\Leftarrow$ $\begin{cases} \text{If } p \text{ is prime:} \\ z^{p-1} = 1 \bmod p \Rightarrow 0 \equiv p-1 \end{cases}$

Paillier Encryption-Decryption

$$N = p \cdot q; N^2 = p^2 \cdot q^2; \text{ E.g. } p=3; q=5; N=15.$$

$$f: \mathcal{Z}_N \times \mathcal{Z}_N^* \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}_{N^2}^*; \mathcal{Z}_N = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\}; + \bmod N; * \bmod N$$

$$\mathcal{Z}_{15}^* = \{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}; \mathcal{Z}_N^* = \{z \mid \gcd(z, N)=1\}; * \bmod N$$

$$\phi(15) = (3-1) \cdot (5-1) = 8; \mathcal{Z}_{N^2}^* = \{w \mid \gcd(w, N^2)=1\}; \otimes \bmod N^2$$

$$\phi = (p-1) \cdot (q-1) = \phi(N): \phi = (3-1) \cdot (5-1) = 2 \cdot 4 = 8$$

$$m \in \mathcal{Z}_N = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\}; \mathcal{Z}_{15} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 14\}$$

$$r \in \mathcal{Z}_N^* = \{z; \gcd(z, N)=1\}; \mathcal{Z}_{15}^* = \{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}$$

$m \in \mathcal{Z}_N = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\}$; $\mathcal{Z}_{15} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 14\}$
 $r \in \mathcal{Z}_N^* = \{z ; \gcd(z, N) = 1\}$; $\mathcal{Z}_{15}^* = \{1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14\}$
 $\Rightarrow \gcd(4, 15) = 1$ $|\mathcal{Z}_{15}^*| = 8$

$\Rightarrow \gcd(9, 15) = 3 \neq 1.$

$\Rightarrow \gcd(7, 15) = 1$

To encrypt message m (probabilistically) the random number r must be generated: (m, r)

$$\text{Enc}(k, r, m) = c = \text{Enc}(\phi, r, m)$$

$k = \phi$



$$(m, r) \in \mathcal{Z}_N \times \mathcal{Z}_N^* ;$$

$$c \in \mathcal{Z}_{N^2}^* = \{z ; \gcd(z, N^2) = 1\} ;$$

$$\text{Dec}(N, c) = m \in \mathcal{Z}_N .$$

$$f : \mathcal{Z}_N \times \mathcal{Z}_N^* \xleftrightarrow{\text{red}} \mathcal{Z}_{N^2}^* ; \quad f(m, r) = c \quad \text{Enc}(\text{Puk}, m, r) = c$$

$$f^{-1} : \mathcal{Z}_{N^2}^* \xleftrightarrow{\text{green}} \mathcal{Z}_N \times \mathcal{Z}_N^* ; \quad f^{-1}(c) = (m, r) \quad \text{Dec}(\text{Prk}, c) = m$$



$$\phi(N) = \phi(p \cdot q) = \phi(p) \cdot \phi(q) = (p-1) \cdot (q-1) = \phi = \text{PrK}_A$$

$$\phi(N^2) = p \cdot (p-1) \cdot q \cdot (q-1) = p \cdot q \cdot (p-1) \cdot (q-1)$$

$$= |\mathcal{I}_N| \cdot |\mathcal{I}_N^*| = |\mathcal{I}_N \times \mathcal{I}_N^*| = |\mathcal{I}_{N^2}^*|.$$

$\text{PuK} = N \rightarrow \text{PrK} = \text{fy} = \phi$; $N = p \cdot q$; When $N \sim 2^{2048} \Rightarrow$ to find p, q is infeasible $\rightarrow$ RSA problem.

Security:

When $\text{PuK} = N$ it is infeasible to find $\phi = (p-1) \cdot (q-1) \Rightarrow$
 $\Rightarrow$ RSA problem is infeasible $\iff$ factorization problem.

$\Rightarrow \text{factor}(15) \rightarrow \text{ans } 3, 5$

Factorization problem is infeasible if N is sufficiently large.
 $N \sim 2^{2048} \rightarrow |N| = 2048 \text{ bits}.$

$$f(m, r) = c \in \mathcal{I}_{N^2}^* \quad \text{Encryption}$$

$$\bar{f}^{-1}(c) = (m, r) \in \mathcal{I}_N \times \mathcal{I}_N^* \quad \text{Decryption}$$

CONSTRUCTION 11.32

Let GenModulus be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1^n , outputs (N, p, q) where $N = pq$ and p and q are n -bit primes (except with probability negligible in n). Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input 1^n run GenModulus(1^n) to obtain (N, p, q) . The public key is $\langle N \rangle$ and the private key is $\langle N, \phi(N) \rangle = \langle N, \phi \rangle$.
- Enc: on input a public key $\langle N \rangle$ and a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, choose a random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and output the ciphertext

$$c := [(1 + N)^m \cdot r^N \bmod N^2].$$

- Dec: on input a private key $\langle N, \phi(N) \rangle$ and a ciphertext c , compute

$$m := \left[\frac{[c^{\phi(N)} \bmod N^2] - 1}{N} \cdot \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N \right].$$

The Paillier encryption scheme.

$A: \text{PrK}_A = x = \phi, \text{PuK}_A = a = N. B: \text{PuK}_A = a = N; m - \text{message to be}$

$$\text{Dec}(\phi, c) = m$$

encrypted in dec.
form: $m < N = pq$.

$$r \leftarrow \text{rand}(\mathcal{Z}_N^*)$$

$$\xleftarrow{c} \text{Enc}(N, r, m) = c$$

Probabilistic encryption:

Let $\mathcal{B}$ is encrypting message m (plaintext) 2 times.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} 1) r_1 \leftarrow \text{rand}(\mathcal{Z}_N^*); c_1 = (1+N)^m r_1^N \bmod N^2 \\ 2) r_2 \leftarrow \text{rand}(\mathcal{Z}_N^*); c_2 = (1+N)^m r_2^N \bmod N^2 \end{array} \right\} c_1 \neq c_2 \text{ since } r_1 \neq r_2.$$

Homomorphic property:

Paillier encryption is additively-multiplicative homomorphism.

Let m_1, m_2 - messages to be encrypted by $\mathcal{B}$.

r_1, r_2 - random numbers for encryption.

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(N, r_1, m_1) = c_1 \\ \text{Enc}(N, r_2, m_2) = c_2 \end{array} \right\} \text{Enc}(N, r_1 \cdot r_2, m_1 + m_2) = c = c_1 \cdot c_2 \bmod N^2$$

$$c_1 = (1+N)^{m_1} \cdot r_1^N \bmod N^2$$

$$c_2 = (1+N)^{m_2} \cdot r_2^N \bmod N^2$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 \cdot c_2 \bmod N^2 &= (1+N)^{m_1} \cdot r_1^N \cdot (1+N)^{m_2} \cdot r_2^N \bmod N^2 = \\ &= (1+N)^{m_1+m_2} \cdot (r_1 \cdot r_2)^N \bmod N^2 = \\ &= \text{Enc}(N, \underbrace{r_1 \cdot r_2}_r, m_1 + m_2) = c \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Dec}(\phi, c) = m_1 + m_2$$

Shortcoming: Paillier encryption requires computations with large numbers taken mod N^2 : $|N^2| = 4096$ bits.

We use toy example $|N^2| = 28 \rightarrow |N| = 14 \rightarrow |p| = |q| = 7$ bits

eVoting: $\text{can1} := m_1$; $\text{can2} := m_2$; $\text{can3} := m_3$

Voters : $\text{PuK} = N$.

Election Committee - EC

$\text{PuK} = N$; $\text{PrK} = \phi$.

$V_1: v_1 \in \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$

$\text{Enc}(N, r_1, v_1) = c_1 \xrightarrow{c_1} \rightarrow$

$V_2: v_2 \in \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$

$\text{Enc}(N, r_2, v_2) = c_2 \xrightarrow{c_2} \rightarrow$

$V_N: v_N \in \{m_1, m_2, m_3\}$

$\text{Enc}(N, r_N, v_N) = c_N \xrightarrow{c_N} \rightarrow \text{EC}:$

$$c_1 \cdot c_2 \cdot \dots \cdot c_N = c \bmod N^2$$

$$c = \text{Enc}(N, R, v)$$

$$R = r_1 \cdot r_2 \cdot \dots \cdot r_N \bmod N$$

$$v = (v_1 + v_2 + \dots + v_N) \bmod N$$

$$\text{EC: Dec}(\phi, c) = v = (v_1 + v_2 + \dots + v_N) \bmod N$$

$$\text{since } v_1 + v_2 + \dots + v_N < N$$

$$v = v_1 + v_2 + \dots + v_N$$

Till this place

```
>> p=127
```

```
p = 127
```

```
>> isprime(p)
```

```
ans = 1
```

```
>> dec2bin(p)
```

```
ans = 1111111
```

```
>> q=113
```

```
q = 113
```

```
>> isprime(q)
```

```
ans = 1
```

```
>> N=p*q
```

```
N = 14351
```

```
>> N_2=int64(N*N)
```

```
N_2 = 205951201
```

```
>> fy=(p-1)*(q-1)
```

```
fy = 14112
```

```
>> m=11111
```

```
m = 11111
```

```
% m<N
```

$$c := \left[\underbrace{(1+N)^{e_1}}_{\text{mod } N^2} \cdot \underbrace{r^{e_2}}_{\text{mod } N^2} \right] \bmod N^2$$

$$c = e_1 \cdot e_2 \bmod N^2$$

```
>> m=11111
```

```
m = 11111
```

```
>> r=genprime(14)
```

```
r = 9049
```

```
>> gcd(r,N)
```

```
ans = 1
```

d_1

ans = 1

```
>> e1=mod_exp((1+N),m,N_2)
e1 = 159453962
>> e2=mod_exp(r,N,N_2)
e2 = 73833387
>> c=mod(e1*e2,N_2)
c = 120531541
```

$$m := \left[\frac{[c^{\phi(N)} \bmod N^2] - 1}{N} \cdot \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N \right].$$

d_1
 $d_2 \bmod N$ $d_3 \bmod N$

$$m = d_2 \cdot d_3 \bmod N$$

```
>> d1=mod_exp(c,fy,N_2)
d1 = 197426708
>> d2=mod((d1-1)/N,N)
d2 = 13757
>> d3=mulinv(fy,N)
d3 = 5224
>> mm=mod(d2*d3,N)
mm = 11111
```

PROPOSITION 11.27 Let $N = pq$, where p, q are distinct odd primes of the same length. Then:

1. $\gcd(N, \phi(N)) = 1$.

2. For any integer $a \geq 0$, we have $(1 + N)^a = (1 + aN) \bmod N^2$.

As a consequence, the order of $(1 + N)$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ is N . That is, $(1 + N)^N = 1 \bmod N^2$ and $(1 + N)^a \neq 1 \bmod N^2$ for any $1 \leq a < N$.

3. $\mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$, with isomorphism $f: \mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_N^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ given by

$$f(a, b) = [(1 + N)^a \cdot b^N \bmod N^2].$$

⁴Recall that $(\mathbb{Z}_N)$ is a group under addition modulo N , while $(\mathbb{Z}_N^*)$ is a group under multiplication modulo N .

To show that f is an isomorphism, we show that $f(a_1, b_1) \cdot f(a_2, b_2) \stackrel{\text{mod } N^2}{=} f(a_1 + a_2, b_1 \cdot b_2)$. (Note that multiplication on the left-hand side of the equality takes place modulo N^2 , while addition/multiplication on the right-hand side takes place modulo N .) We have:

$$\begin{aligned} f(a_1, b_1) \cdot f(a_2, b_2) &= ((1+N)^{a_1} \cdot b_1^N) \cdot ((1+N)^{a_2} \cdot b_2^N) \bmod N^2 \\ &= (1+N)^{a_1+a_2} \cdot (b_1 b_2)^N \bmod N^2. \end{aligned}$$

Since $(1+N)$ has order N modulo N^2 (by Claim 11.29), we can apply Proposition 7.49 and obtain

$$\begin{aligned} f(a_1, b_1) \cdot f(a_2, b_2) &= (1+N)^{a_1+a_2} \cdot (b_1 b_2)^N \bmod N^2 \\ &= (1+N)^{a_1+a_2 \bmod N} \cdot (b_1 b_2)^N \bmod N^2. \end{aligned} \quad (11.8)$$

We are not yet done, since $b_1 b_2$ in Equation (11.8) represents multiplication modulo N^2 whereas we would like it to be modulo N . Let $b_1 b_2 = r + \gamma N$,

where γ, r are integers with $1 \leq r < N$ (r cannot be 0 since $b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and so their product cannot be divisible by N). Note that $r = b_1 b_2 \bmod N$. We also have

$$\begin{aligned} (b_1 b_2)^N &= (r + \gamma N)^N \bmod N^2 \\ &= \sum_{k=0}^N \binom{N}{k} r^{N-k} (\gamma N)^k \bmod N^2 \\ &= r^N + N \cdot r^{N-1} \cdot (\gamma N) = r^N = (b_1 b_2 \bmod N)^N \bmod N^2, \end{aligned}$$

using the binomial expansion theorem as in Claim 11.29. Plugging this in to Equation (11.8) we get the desired result:

$$\begin{aligned} f(a_1, b_1) \cdot f(a_2, b_2) &= (1+N)^{a_1+a_2 \bmod N} \cdot (b_1 b_2 \bmod N)^N \bmod N^2 \\ &= f(a_1 + a_2, b_1 b_2), \end{aligned}$$

proving that f is an isomorphism from $\mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ to $\mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$. ■

Encryption: m - message to be encrypted; $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$

$r \leftarrow \text{rand}(\mathbb{Z}_N^*) : \gcd(r, N) = 1 \rightarrow r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$

$\text{Enc}(a, m, r) = f(m, r) = c \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$.

$$f(m, r) = (1 + \textcircled{N})^m \cdot r^{\textcircled{N}} \bmod \textcircled{N^2} = c \iff \text{PrK}_A = a = N.$$

~~Due to isomorphism $f : c^\phi = (m, r)^\phi = (m \cdot \phi, r^\phi)$~~

$$\text{Dec}(\text{PrK}_A = \phi, c) = m \iff \text{PrK}_A = \phi(N) = \phi = \cancel{N} = (p-1) \cdot (q-1).$$

Decryption. We now describe how decryption can be performed efficiently given the factorization of N . For c constructed as above, we claim that $\underline{m}$ is recovered by the following steps:

• Set $\hat{c} := [c^{\textcircled{\phi(N)}} \bmod N^2]$.

• Set $\hat{m} := (\hat{c} - 1)/N$. (Note that this is carried out over the integers.)

$$c^{\phi(N)} = c^{\phi} \bmod N^2$$

$$5/4 = 1,25$$

$$-1$$

- Set $\hat{m} := (\hat{c} - 1)/N$. (Note that this is carried out over the integers.)
- Set $m := [\hat{m} \cdot \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N]$.

$$5/4 = 1,25$$

$$\phi \cdot \phi^{-1} = 1 \bmod N$$

To see why this works, let $c \leftrightarrow (m, r)$ for an arbitrary $r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [c^{\phi(N)} \bmod N^2] \\ &\leftrightarrow (m, r)^{\phi(N)} \\ &= ([m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N], [r^{\phi(N)} \bmod N]) \\ &= ([m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N], 1) \end{aligned}$$

Euler $\mathbb{T}$: If $\gcd(N, \phi) = 1$, Then
 $r^{\phi} \bmod N = 1$

Fermat $\mathbb{T}$: If p is prime $\Rightarrow \forall r : r^{p-1} = 1 \bmod p$
 $\phi(p) = p-1$

By Proposition 11.27(3), this means that $\hat{c} = (1 + N)^{[m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N]} \bmod N^2$.
 Using Proposition 11.27(2), we know that

$$\hat{c} = (1 + N)^{[m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N]} = (1 + [m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N] \cdot N) \bmod N^2.$$

$$\hat{c} = m \cdot \phi \bmod N \Rightarrow m = \hat{c} \cdot \phi^{-1} \bmod N$$

To find $\phi^{-1} \bmod N$

414

Since $1 + [m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N] \cdot N$ is always less than N^2 we can drop the $\bmod N^2$ at the end and view the above as an equality over the integers. Thus, $\hat{m} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\hat{c} - 1)/N = [m \cdot \phi(N) \bmod N]$ and, finally,

$$m = [\hat{m} \cdot \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N],$$

as required. (Note that $\phi(N)$ is invertible modulo N since $\gcd(N, \phi(N)) = 1$.)

We give a complete description of the Paillier encryption scheme, followed by an example of the above calculations.

CONSTRUCTION 11.32

Let GenModulus be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1^n , outputs (N, p, q) where $N = pq$ and p and q are n -bit primes (except with probability negligible in n). Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input 1^n run GenModulus(1^n) to obtain (N, p, q) . The public key is (N) and the private key is $(N, \phi(N))$: $\phi(N) = \phi = pq$.

- B : • Enc: on input a public key N and a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, choose a random $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and output the ciphertext
- PuK_A

$$c := [(1 + N)^m \cdot r^N \bmod N^2].$$

- A : • Dec: on input a private key $(N, \phi(N))$ and a ciphertext c , compute
- PrK

$$m := \left[\frac{[c^{\phi(N)} \bmod N^2] - 1}{N} \cdot \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N \right].$$

The Paillier encryption scheme.

Additively - Multiplicative encryption: v_1, v_2 - votes to be encrypted.

$$PuK = N; \quad PrK = \phi.$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Voter 1: } r_1 \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathcal{I}_N^*) \\ \text{Enc}(N, v_1, r_1) = c_1 \\ \text{Voter 2: } r_2 \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathcal{I}_N^*) \\ \text{Enc}(N, v_2, r_2) = c_2 \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \begin{array}{l} c_1 * c_2 \bmod N^2 = \\ = \text{Enc}(N, v_1 + v_2, r_1 \cdot r_2) \end{array}$$

$$\gcd(r, n) = 1$$

$$r \in \mathcal{I}_N^* = \{r; \gcd(r, n) = 1\}$$

$$f_1 = (1 + n)^m \bmod n^2$$

$$f_2 = r^n \bmod n^2$$

$$c = \frac{f_1}{f_2} \bmod n^2$$

$$A: \text{Enc}_{PuK_B}(m) = c$$

$$m \in M = \mathcal{I}_N = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, N-1\}; \quad c \in C = \mathcal{I}_{N^2}^*$$

$$1^n = 1 \cdot 1 \cdot 1 \dots 1$$

n - required number of bits

$$m < N; |N| = 2048b.$$

$$B: \text{Dec}_{\text{PrK}_e}(c) = m$$

$\phi^{-1} \bmod N$ computation with Octave software

$$>> \text{fyem1} = \text{mulinv}(\text{fy}, N)$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} \text{Enc}(m_1 + m_2) & = & \text{Enc}(m_1) \cdot \text{Enc}(m_2) & \bmod N^2 \\ c & = & c_1 \cdot c_2 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(m_1 \cdot m_2) = \text{Enc}(m_1) \cdot \text{Enc}(m_2) \\ \text{Enc}(m_1 + m_2) = \text{Enc}(m_1) + \text{Enc}(m_2) \end{array} \quad \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} \text{Enc}(m_1 \cdot m_2) = \text{Enc}(m_1) \cdot \text{Enc}(m_2) \\ \text{Enc}(m_1 + m_2) = \text{Enc}(m_1) + \text{Enc}(m_2) \end{array}} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{Full} \\ \text{homomorphie} \\ \text{(isomorphic)} \end{array}$$

Encrypted Data Base

$$m_1 \longrightarrow \text{randomas } c_1$$

$$m_2 \longrightarrow \text{randomas } c_2$$

c

server - cloud

$$m_1, m_2 < N$$

$$\text{Dec}(c) = m_1 \cdot m_2$$